Railroads came of age during Civil War,
particularly so for Kentucky’s L&N line

Railroads were new and relatively untried prior to the Civil War. But rail travel came of age during the conflict, particularly so with the Louisville and Nashville (L&N) line in Kentucky.

The L&N was the lifeline for the Union armies of Gens. Don Carlos Buell, William Rosecrans, William T. Sherman and George Thomas and a frequent target of Gen. John Hunt Morgan’s Confederate cavalry.

Shorter rail lines – such as the Kentucky Central and the Louisville, Lexington and Frankfort – also were key, moving supplies south across the Ohio River to Covington or Louisville, then transported to Kentucky’s interior. Like the L&N, both railroads were guarded by the Union, but often came under attack by Confederate guerrilla and regular forces.

During the war, soldiers, material and food routinely were transported by rail along with civilians and the raw material necessary to keep the war effort progressing.

When the war began, there were approximately 19 million people living in the United States. Of these, nine million were living in the South. The South was largely an agrarian society dependent on cash crops such as tobacco and cotton and, to a lesser extent, staple crops to feed its peoples and armies.

Two-thirds of the rail miles and four-fifths of the manufacturing power of the entire nation were located in states loyal to the cause of the Union. In all of the states that left the Union, there was only one plant which could reclaim rail that was bent into what became known as “Sherman’s Bowties.” The South was at a distinct disadvantage in men, material, transportation and productive abilities.

There were more than 200 railroads in existence at the start of the war. The majority of rail lines were found in those states that remained loyal to the national government. Most of these rails were four feet, eight and one-half inches apart. By contrast, the South had only about one-third the mileage in the North and the gauges of the rails varied widely. This meant that the North could transport more troops and material to more places with less transfers due to gauge differences than the South.

The South immediately realized the potential of railroads and used the rails it had to transport troops from one part not under attack to support fellow troops in a threatened area. The North was not so quick to learn this lesson.

At the beginning of hostilities, the northern railroads did not contribute as they should have to the Union war effort. Most railroad executives were more concerned about the rates for transporting war material and the profits they would make due to the high demand for their services than they were for the welfare of the Union.

For a period of time after the South fired on Fort Sumter, miles of track ripped up by Confederate raiders were left in a state of disrepair and, while boxes of food and ammunition sat on sidings, railroad executives haggled with army officers over the cost of transporting the goods.

Lincoln’s Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, who was a prominent investor in numerous railroads, was forced to resign because of his profiteering by manipulation of the rates the War Department would pay for the transportation of its soldiers and material. Such corruption in the rail industry prompted the enactment of the Railways and Telegraph Act of January 31, 1862. This legislation enabled the President to take possession of railroads and run them as required to preserve public safety.

The War Department would supervise any railroads taken over by the government. This act was the precedent for the United States Railway Administration of World War I and government influence on railroads in World War II.